Sanctions were imposed on

Major General Nguyễn Văn Viện, director of the Drug-related Crime Investigation Police Department under the Ministry of Public Security. — VNA/ VNS Photo Doãn Tấn

Major General Nguyễn Văn Viện, director of the Drug-related Crime Investigation Police Department under the Ministry of Public Security, talks to the Việt Nam Government Portal chinhphu.vn about the drug-related crime situation and measures to mobilise resources to combat drug crimes.

In 2020, the drug-related crime investigation police force directly conducted or co-ordinated with other authorities to investigate 24,548 drug-related criminal cases, arrested 36,404 drug offenders and seized more than 738kg of heroin, 3.4 tonnes and more than 2 million synthetic drug tablets, and about 255kg of marijuana. It saw year-on-year increases of 12.85 per cent in the number of cases and 9.15 per cent in the number of criminals.

As the COVID-19 pandemic has adversely affected economic, political-diplomatic, cultural and social aspects of countries all over the world, including Việt Nam, drug crimes have increased.

The authorities have cracked down on maritime drug trafficking cases, notably one led by a former South Korean police officer in July 2020. Could you elaborate on this?

There have been complex developments in maritime drug trafficking crimes. This is a route that has been used by international drug criminals to transport a very large amount of drugs.

As the COVID-19 pandemic has suspended some international air routes and road routes are also under tighter controls against COVID-19, drug trafficking at sea is becoming more complex.

Drug traffickers have constantly changed the way they work. They are led by Chinese Taiwanese or African citizens under the management of international drug crime organisations, which work with those from the drug hotspots like the Golden Triangle to establish the drug trafficking rings and transport drugs to Việt Nam and other parts of Southeast Asia.

The ringleaders are not involved directly in transporting the drugs. They manage and assign jobs into different steps to avoid being detected by the authorities. They establish import and export companies and rent warehouses in provinces in the central and southern regions of Việt Nam to gather drugs, which are hidden in normal goods like electronic equipment. They then consign the goods for other logistics companies to conduct procedures to ship drugs to other countries. Therefore, it is difficult to expand the investigation and arrest the ringleaders who are foreigners.

To prevent maritime drug crimes, we are promoting communications so businesses and local people are better aware of how drug-related crimes work are more cautious and report criminals to the authorities.

We work with other forces like customs, border and coast guard to investigate and handle the crimes. We also work with the authorities of other countries in the region to share information and together handle criminal cases when needed.

The illicit use of drugs in bars, karaoke parlours and hotels seems to be on the rise. Is there any fundamental solution to prevent this?

In recent years, the illicit use of drugs, especially synthetic drugs, in bars, hostels and hotels has been complicated.

We have difficulties in preventing this, especially when the Penal Code removed Article 199, recognising narcotic users as patients, not criminals, making it challenging to manage, prevent and deter drug users.

In addition, drug users often rent luxury apartments or resort with good sound insulation. Landlords don’t seem to care what tenants use their properties for and the tenants often use drugs in these rooms with layers of locked doors, making it difficult to detect and catch them red-handed.

Meanwhile, there are still overlaps in some legal documents related to this issue, which are also inconsistent with reality. The sanctions imposed on property owners where the violation occurs are still too lax to deter violations.

To prevent the illicit use of drugs, the Drug-related Investigation Police Department is working on a report to the Ministry of Public Security to propose the approval of the amended Drug Prevention and Control Law, which suggests additional charges for the illegal use of drugs. At the same time, it also works with competent authorities to handle difficulties in managing and treating drug addicts.

Communication work on the impacts of drugs needs also to be promoted. It is also essential to get a grip on the situation and promptly detect and handle drug hotspots.

It is crucial to assess the responsibilities of organisations or individuals, especially leaders in places where crime and drug evils take place in a complex, rampant and prolonged way that causes insecurity for local people.

We have witnessed the great sacrifices of police forces in combating drug crimes yet there are also some police officers who have been arrested and prosecuted for involvement in drug crimes or having their People’s Police titles stripped due to their illegal use of drugs. What are the implications of these incidents?

The drug-related crime investigation police force works in a tough and challenging environment, their battlefield is often the dangerous mountainous areas. Drug criminals are becoming more audacious and fight fiercely when they are detected. Therefore, bloodshed and the sacrifice offered during peacetime by this force is heavier than any other forces. As many as 26 officials, officers and people have died in this combat.

Recently, however, there are some police officers who have tolerated, protected, covered up crimes and colluded with drug offenders. This not only enables the crimes but also erodes the trust of the people and adversely impacts the reputation and prestige of the people’s police force as a whole. These individuals will be punished strictly in accordance with the law.

To build a transparent and valiant drug investigation police force who are willing to face challenges, accept to sacrifice, have a strong will and do not fall into the bribery and manipulation of criminals, I think political and ideological education is crucial. The officers need to follow the six teachings that late President Hồ Chí Minh has given the police force, considering this as the most important element in the process of building the police force.

In addition, it is also necessary to keep tabs on the cadres and officers to promptly detect and handle violations while giving praise to groups or individuals who have made excellent achievements in drug crime prevention and control.

What should we do to mobilise the resources and the strength of the whole political system and people to prevent drug-related crimes?

Promoting the strength of the whole political system and entire people in drug crime prevention and combat is one of the goals and tasks specified by the Politburo in Directive No 36-CT/TW on August 16, 2019, on enhancing the effectiveness of drug control work.

Especially amid the complex developments of drug crimes, we consider this the foundation to help to prevent and harness the development of drug crimes and evils in Việt Nam.

To achieve this, firstly, the authorities need to closely implement Directive No 36, direct and inspect the implementation of drug crime prevention and control in organisations and agencies. This shouldn’t be considered as the task of the public security sector alone.

In addition, it is essential to enhance communication work, disseminate information on the law, and raise the awareness and responsibility of people in drug-related crime prevention and control. We need to diversify content and forms of communication in accordance with localities, regions and subjects, especially pupils, students, workers and people from ethnic minority groups.

Sharing experience and successful models and praising those with excellent achievements in drug prevention and control are also important.

We also need to continue to enhance the capacities and virtues of public security forces, gain trust from the people and receive support from them in ensuring public security in general and controlling drug crimes in specific. VNS

The US Navy also conducted coordination operations of two aircraft carriers for the first time since 2014, while promoting air patrol and submarine deployment.

Sanctions

In April and May 2020, US Navy warships moved close to Chinese survey ships in Malaysia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The US Air Force also increased the operation of B52, B1-B and B2 strategic bombers in the East Sea.

The Trump administration accused China of using the pandemic to promote its sovereignty claims and in April urged Beijing to stop provocative activities and bullying practices.

More significantly, the US has taken a clearer stance on the legal basis of China’s sovereignty claims.

On June 1, 2020, the US submitted a diplomatic note to the United Nations opposing China’s claim to sovereignty in the East Sea because it was inconsistent with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS).

The US Department of Defense has increased the frequency of free navigation operations (FONOP) in the East Sea

On July 13, 2020, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issued an important statement supporting the PCA’s 2016 ruling.

Specifically, the US rejected China’s illegal “9-dash line”, its sovereignty claim over the offshore resources in the EEZ of Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Indonesia as well as the Vanh Khan, Co May and James.

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said: “The world will not allow Beijing to treat the East Sea as its maritime empire. America stands with our Southeast Asian allies and partners in protecting their sovereign rights to offshore resources.”

In a speech at a consulting organization in Washington D.C. a day after Pompeo’s statement, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs David Stilwell described Chinese conglomerates operating in the East Sea as tools of economic coercion and international abuse.

According to David Stilwell, during negotiations of the Codes of Conduct in the East Sea (COC), China sought to limit the ability of Southeast Asian countries to conduct military exercises with foreign countries, using intimidation tactics to prevent Southeast Asian countries from making sovereignty statement of cooperation in energy exploitation with non-Chinese companies.

Stilwell also mentioned the possibility that the US would impose sanctions against individuals and businesses participating in implementing Chinese policies in the East Sea.

On August 26, 2020, the US Department of State imposed sanctions on some Chinese citizens responsible for or involved in the large-scale construction, renovation or militarization of disputed outposts in the East Sea.

The US Department of Commerce named 24 Chinese state-owned companies involved in the construction of seven artificial islands in the Spratly archipelago on its “blacklist”.

The note of the US Mission to the United Nations against China’s claims. Photo: USUN

Reaction of Southeast Asia

Southeast Asian claimants in the East Sea expressed concern over China’s aggressive behavior in this water and expressed a tougher stance.

The responses of the Southeast Asian countries were mainly in legal aspects. Since December 2019, Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines have sent notes to the UN opposing China’s “9-dash line” “historic rights” claims in the East Sea.

More importantly, by opposing the claim of China, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines clearly mentioned the PCA’s ruling 2016, thereby restoring the validity of this ruling.

Brunei for the first time issued a declaration on the East Sea on July 20, 2020, which emphasized that the negotiations to resolve disputes should comply with the UNCLOS.

ASEAN also emphasized more on the UNCLOS, considering this the foundation for determining sovereignty, jurisdiction and legitimate interests related to the seas.

The Philippines adjusted its stance in the direction of being more rigid. In May, its navy opened a new stop on the island of Pagasa and announced plans to develop infrastructure there.

On the fourth anniversary of the PCA’s ruling, Philippine Foreign Minister Teddy Locsin said the ruling was “non-negotiable”. After Pompeo’s statement, Philippine Defense Minister Delfin Lorenzana called on China to comply with the ruling. In August, Mr. Locsin announced that if the Philippines were attacked in the East Sea, he would trigger the 1951 military alliance with the US, while Minister Lorenzana argued that the “9-dash line” of Beijing is only imaginary.

Maintaining a long-standing policy, Indonesia reaffirmed its opposition to the “9-dash line” as well as China’s proposal to negotiate overlapping claims near the Natuna Islands. In July 2020, the Indonesian army conducted large-scale naval and air exercises near Natuna.

The Malaysian delegation to the United Nations sent notes denying China’s East Sea claims

Meanwhile, the Malaysian Navy and Coast Guard patrolled near the West Capella exploration vessel and tracked the presence of the Chinese survey vessels in its EEZ in April-May. The Malaysian Government reaffirmed that it would protect the rights and interests of the country in the East Sea.

On August 13, Malaysian Foreign Minister Hishammuddin Hussein made a speech emphasizing perseverance and consistently using diplomatic methods. Malaysia was successful in making Chinese ships to leave the areas where its Petronas Corporation operates.

Fierce competition between the US and China

The relationship between China and the United States since the Covid-19 pandemic has entered a period of increasingly fierce competition in the race between a superpower and the one wishing to take the throne.

With the bipartisan consensus in the US on China issue, the new US administration will not be able to implement a more peaceable policy in the East Sea. However, the actual implementation may differ.

In 2021, the US will continue to increase the frequency of exercises with allies and partners, presence and patrol campaigns to ensure freedom of navigation (FONOP) in the East Sea.

The possibility of a clash between the US and Chinese military forces in this area remains unpredictable. Most likely, Washington will continue to impose additional sanctions against companies and individuals in China that the US believes commits violations in the East Sea.

The East Sea will be one of the most important places for the US to curb China’s rise. Southeast Asian countries will become the focus of the growing Sino-American competition.

Road to complete COC still tough

China will continue to push territorial claims to divert attention away from economic troubles.

It is likely that in 2021, China will continue to put pressure on the exploration and exploitation of natural resources of the East Sea countries, and at the same time promote joint exploitation cooperation in Chinese style, through manipulating and dividing ASEAN countries.

In 2020, due to complicated epidemic developments, officials of the 10 ASEAN member countries and China could not meet to continue negotiations on the COC.

The sensitive nature of these negotiations does not allow it to be conducted via online form.

Beijing seems to want to resume negotiations. However, the stances of the parties are still very far apart. Moreover, as China ignores international law, and wants to monopolize the East Sea, maintaining the COC negotiation process is actually just a measure of buying time to implement its intentions in this sea.

Therefore, even when the discussions resume, the goal of completing the COC in 2021 that China unilaterally declared will be difficult to achieve.

Viet Hoang

China increases activities to monopolize East Sea

Since the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, tensions in the East Sea have increased.

China’s turning points to “mastering” operations in the East Sea

Experts believe that China already has a significant presence in the East Sea, going ahead of the US, and will use this advantage to force small countries to follow them.

Vietnam successfully assumed the role of both ASEAN Chair in 2020 and non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council for the term 2020-2021.

Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc (L), the Chair of ASEAN 2020, witnesses the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. (Photo: Duc Anh)

Strong leadership in the region

This is the first time Vietnam has assumed such a “dual role”. This coincidence is quite special but not surprising as it is an inevitable consequence of the tireless efforts of Vietnam over the past decades, the result of an open and multilateral foreign policy to diversify international relations and actively integrate into the world, initiated and successfully implemented by the Communist Party of Vietnam. It shows the recognition from and appreciation by the international community for Vietnam’s global role and its practical contribution to international and regional affairs, while demonstrating Vietnam’s increasingly high position and prestige in the international arena.

However, even with great opportunities, history has always challenged Vietnam’s bravery and wisdom. When Vietnam officially assumed its “dual role”, it was also a time when the world was to face an unprecedented challenge in the form of the outbreak of COVID-19. The rhythm of life was turned upside down, the world economy stagnated, international traffic was paralysed, and many global and regional security issues had to be put to one side temporarily to make room for the epidemic response.

In that unexpected context, as Chair of ASEAN 2020, Vietnam quickly shifted the agenda and focus of ASEAN to COVID-19 prevention and control. The pandemic poses an unprecedented challenge, so the response also requires unprecedented measures. Under the leadership of Vietnam, many “firsts” have come about to help the bloc adapt in this difficult period: It was the first ASEAN Summit to meet three times in one year instead of twice as usual. There were many high-level conferences and ministerial meetings held online for the first time. And in particular, many important ASEAN documents were signed online for the first time in history.

As well as effectively controlling the epidemic, Vietnam also actively promoted international cooperation to overcome it together. One piece of proof of the ASEAN Chair’s active and responsible role in 2020 was the Vietnam’s initiative to convene an ASEAN Special Summit on the COVID-19 Response in April 2020. From this, a series of specific measures to control the epidemic were introduced, such as setting up a COVID-19 response fund, a regional reserve of medical supplies, building a standard disease response process, and issuing a comprehensive post-COVID-19 recovery plan, that will not only help the region deal more effectively with COVID-19, but will also solidify the spirit of the slogan “a Cohesive and Responsive ASEAN”, a trademark of ASEAN in the COVID-19 epidemic era.

With the strong will and action of the entire ASEAN community, effective cooperation from partners and the firm steering of “captain” Vietnam, ASEAN has substantially overcome the storm. Looking back, it can be affirmed that Vietnam’s ASEAN Chairmanship Year 2020 has been a comprehensive, resounding, complete and substantial success. Vietnam is not only a member seriously implementing committed-to agreements, but is also becoming a solid and reliable support for the region, especially in a moment when ASEAN faces challenges like COVID-19.

Recognising Vietnam’s successful role as ASEAN Chair 2020, ASEAN Secretary-General Dato Lim Jock Hoi commented that Vietnam showed its strong leadership in leading a regional collective response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The November 2020 issue of Diplomat magazine ran a headline article on Vietnam’s ASEAN Chairmanship 2020. With its title “Vietnam’s Virtual Charm Offensive”, the article praised the country for its surprising creativity in making the impossible possible, as it skilfully reached consensus in the region as well as with partners, using an online dialogue platform never tried before.

From “active participation” to “proactively contributing to shaping the rules of the conduct”

In January 2020, Vietnam returned to the meeting room of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a non-permanent member, while at the same time serving in the role of rotating presidency of the council for the month. This is not the first time Vietnam has participated in the UNSC (non-permanent member of the UNSC for the 2008-2009 term), and while the roles and duties of UNSC non-permanent members have not changed compared to before, the situation was much different.

Fierce strategic competition among major countries has downgraded solidarity and unity within the UNSC to a lower level than 10 years ago. On many issues, major countries have conflicts of interests, so it is difficult for them to find a common voice. Meanwhile, tensions in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America have not “cooled down”, along with 68 conflicts and a series of backlogs in the 75 years since the UN’s founding still remaining on the agenda.

In particular, the COVID-19 pandemic has become an unprecedented global challenge. Not only does it affect every aspect of international life, it also reveals how multilateral spirit has been eroded. Faced with the challenges of powerful politics, populism, declined political commitment, and pragmatism, amongst others, multilateralism and international cooperation have been seriously affected.

How to offer both practical ideas and initiatives to solve global issues while balancing the interests of stakeholders is not an easy task for Vietnam, especially when as the UNSC’s decisions are always associated with particularly important and sensitive issues, such as war and peace, anti-terrorism, and imposing sanctions or not.

However, few countries have advantages like Vietnam has. Having been through two wars, more than anyone, Vietnam understands the value of peace, so the country always strives for the advancement of humanity. There are also some countries that can put aside the past to heal relations and establish cooperation with “former foes”, similar to how the Vietnamese people have. Therefore, although it is not a big or rich country, Vietnam can actively participate in the UNSC.

In fact, together with other non-permanent members, Vietnam has become a bridge to assist the P5 group (the permanent members of the UNSC) understand each other better, thereby minimising deadlocks and inefficiencies in the council due to disagreements among these countries. Not only that, the responsible participation, contribution and “rational” voice of Vietnam on seemingly very distant issues in Africa, Latin America or the Middle East has been recognised by the international community. It can be said Vietnam’s role has contributed to solving many important global problems, shaping the development of the future world.

On the UN forum, the world has seen more about a steadily growing Vietnam with its new posture – the position of a nation with mastery over its destiny, as well as a being an independent, autonomous, peaceful and stable country on its development path, while having the influence of a partner shifting from “active participation” to “actively contributing to building, shaping new structures, new rules of conduct”, a partner always having a responsible role in regional and global “playgrounds”.

This “dual role” brought about a successful year for Vietnam’s multilateral diplomacy, opening up great opportunities for the country to continue to promote its precious experience in “combining national strength with the fortes of the era” to enhance Vietnam’s position in the international arena, contributing to promoting national development and placing it ahead in the global race.

Nhan Dan

Vietnam gains breakthrough diplomatic success as UNSC member: official

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