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The Hanoitimes – The pandemic has prompted joint efforts under the Vietnam’s Chairmanship in the course of unprecedented challenges that threat the 10-nation region of 622 million people.

Covid-19 has given impetus to ASEAN-wide defence cooperation, said Southeast Asia regional specialist Carl Thayer, Emeritus Professor at the University of New South Wales, Canberra.

Vietnam’s Defenes Minister Ngo Xuan Lich at the 14th ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) held on December 9. Photo: MOD

According to the famous professor, in February 2020, ASEAN Defence Ministers were proactive in issuing a Joint Statement on Defence Cooperation against Disease Outbreaks to exchange information and best practices by organizing a tabletop exercise under the ASEAN Center for Military Medicine.

In addition, they vowed to mobilize the Network of ASEAN Chemical, Biological, Radiological Defence Experts to promote cooperation to manage infectious disease outbreaks; to cooperate to counter fake news on the coronavirus; and to work with other relevant ASEAN sectoral bodies as well as national health authorities to combat the pandemic.

In the year, Vietnamese defence senior officials have reiterated that despite the pandemic, as the Chair of the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM+ in 2020, Vietnam has not and will not let the Covid-19 disrupt defence cooperation within ASEAN as well as between ASEAN and its dialogue partners.

Commenting it, Prof. Thayer said Vietnam began its term as ASEAN Chair 2020 by hosting the ASEAN Defence Ministers Retreat in Hanoi in February. That meeting adopted a joint statement on defence cooperation to deal with the coronavirus.

In March, Vietnam hosted the 13th annual meeting and 5th retreat of the Track 2 Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institutions (NADI). Deputy Minister of National Defence, Lieutenant General Nguyen Chi Vinh called on NADI to play a proactive role in analyzing, assessing and forecasting risks to defense and security, to suggest responses, and provide consultancy advice on security partnerships for each country and NADI.

Also in March, Vietnam hosted a virtual meeting of the Board of Directors of the ASEAN Center for Military Medicine. Major General Nguyen Xuan Kien, director of the Department of Military Medicine, hosted the meeting. He suggested a joint disease prevention and information exchange exercise among ASEAN military medical forces and professional training to combat Covid-19.

Since March, Covid-19 has prevented ASEAN defence officials from meeting face-to-face. Vietnam had to cancel an ASEAN and international fleet review and an international conference on maritime security due to Covid-19.

Vietnam responded to the Covid-19 challenge by holding virtual meetings. For example, the ASEAN Defence Senior Officials Meeting was held by video conference in May. This meeting discussed an online epidemic response drill.

Lt Gen. Vinh spoke to the meeting about Vietnam’s response including using military barracks to quarantine those infected by the coronavirus, producing Covid-19 test kits, managing border crossings, and sharing information and support with outside countries.

Vietnam also hosted a virtual celebration of the tenth anniversary of the ADMM-Plus at the 7th ADMM-Plus meeting last week.

Notably, the professor commented that the theme “Defence Cooperation for a Cohesive and Responsive ASEAN” was entirely appropriate for 2020 because of the pandemic.

He noted that while the ADMM and ADMM-Plus have addressed non-traditional security threats in the past no challenge was more threatening than the coronavirus. The ADMM joint statement in February 2020 was unequivocal that defence ministers “remain resolutely committed to doing our part, and staying united to overcome the Covid-19 outbreak for the benefit of the people of ASEAN.”

The Hanoitimes – The latest patrols took place on April 28-29 without encountering any unsafe or unprofessional behavior from Chinese military.

Since Donald Trump became president of the US in 2017, the US Department of Defense has stepped up the number of freedom of navigation operational patrols (FONOPS) in the South China Sea, according to Carl Thayer, Emeritus Professor at The University of New South Wales and Director of Thayer Consultancy.

Carl Thayer, Emeritus Professor at The University of New South Wales and Director of Thayer Consultancy. Photo: VnExpress

According a Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, May 1, 2020, the US Navy conducted six FONOPS in 2017, five in 2018, nine in 2019, and four in the first quarter of 2020.

The frequency is much higher than that under the Obama administration. The Obama administration presided over four FONOPs in the South China Sea near Chinese possessions, Ankit Panda wrote for The Diplomat in September 2017. Their irregularity made them appear subservient to political and diplomatic interests, undermining their legal signaling utility.

Under the National Defense Strategy of the United States in 2018, US military forces are enjoined to ‘Be strategically predictable, but operationally unpredictable’.

This was demonstrated by two unprecedented back-to-back FONOPS in the South China Sea conducted in late April.

On April 28, the guided missile destroyer USS Barry (DDG52) conducted a FONOP in the waters around the Paracel islands. The next day, on April 29, the guided missile cruiser USS Bunker Hill (CG52) conducted a similar patrol in waters around Gaven Reef in the Spratly islands.

According to a spokesperson for the US Navy’s 7th Fleet, the USS Bunker Hill “asserted navigational rights and freedoms in the Spratly islands, consistent with international law.”

USS Barry (DDG52), an Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer, commissioned in 1992. Photo: Navalnews

China invariably responds predictably to what it perceives as “illegal intrusions” by US warships conducting freedom of navigation operational patrols in the South China Sea.

For example, in January this year, the USS Montgomery made a freedom of navigation patrol in the waters near Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly islands. The Global Times quoted Senior Colonel Li Huamin, spokesperson for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Southern Theater Command, that PLA air and naval forces “tracked down and monitored the vessel’s course, verified and identified the vessel and expelled it.”

Senior Colonel Li also alleged that, “The US ship’s deliberate provocation during the traditional lunar Chinese New Year festival, which harbored ill intentions, is a naked act of navigational hegemony.”

On 28 April, in response to the USS Barry’s FONOP, Senior Colonel Li stated, “This is the first time the PLA Southern Theater Command has actively announced an illegal trespass of a US warship into waters off the Xisha Islands, and also the first time that an announcement was made on the same day since similar arrangements began in November 2018.”

This statement, also published by the Global Times, appears to be a garbled translation into English of Chinese obfuscation with a pinch of hyperbole thrown in for good measure.

Senior Colonel Li also tried to make capital out of the coronavirus pandemic that struck the crews of the USS Theodore Roosevelt and USS Kidd by alleging, “The US Navy’s recent operations near China show its own fear of losing presence and influence in the Asia-Pacific region amid multiple Covid-19 outbreaks on its warships.”

USS Bunker Hill (CG52), a Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser of the United States Navy, commissioned on 20 September 1986. Photo: Deanoinamerica

However, a US Navy spokesperson spoke with respect to the USS Barry’s patrol, “the operation proceeded as planned without encountering any unsafe or unprofessional behavior from Chinese military aircraft or warships.”

In sum, China is engaged in information warfare by trying to portray itself as acting staunchly in defense of China’s claim to “indisputable sovereignty” in the South China Sea, while acting circumspectly in the face of a more powerful naval adversary.

The US, for its part, is shrugging off the public relations setback of the coronavirus infection of the crew of the USS Theodore Roosevelt by demonstrating strategic predictably – by maintaining a naval presence in the South China Sea – while also executing operational unpredictability – two back-to-back FONOPS.

Prior to the two FONOPS, it should be noted, the USS Barry twice transited the Taiwan Strait in April. The USS Bunker Hill accompanied the USS America to demonstrate naval presence in waters off East Malaysia where a Chinese survey vessel and a China Coast Guard ship were harassing oil exploration activities conducted by a drillship on contract to Petronas, Malaysia’s state-owned oil company, Thayer said.

The Hanoitimes – Notes verbales, unsigned formal diplomatic communication, would largely ruin China’s legal position.

The importance of Malaysia’s notes verbales, and those filed by other states, to the United Nations to protest China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea is that they challenge the legal basis of China’s claims on the basis of an Arbitral Tribunal Award established under UNCLOS Annex VII.

If the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) ruled in favour of Malaysia, this would be a huge blow to China’s legal position not to say China’s prestige, Emeritus professor Carl Thayer, a veteran Southeast Asia regional expert, told Hanoitimes in an interview.

Claimants in South China Sea where more than US$5 trillion in cargo passes through per year. Source: Visiontimes

What does a note verbale mean?

Prof. Carl Thayer at the University of New South Wales, Canberra said a note verbale is an unsigned formal diplomatic communication. It is how states communicate with each other and with international institutions such as the CLCS. Each institution has its own rules of procedure on how states should communicate their views and how the institution, in this case the CLCS will handle these claims.

The professor went on to say that in the case of the CLCS, a note verbale sets out a state’s official legal position on claims for an extended continental shelf. If a state fails to respond to a claim, this could be taken as evidence that the state acquiesced. In other words, China must submit a counter claim to demonstrate that the issue in question is in dispute. Under the CLCS’ Rules of Procedure, the Commission cannot proceed if there is a dispute between two or more states.

Role of Malaysia in protesting chorus

Malaysian-contracted drillship West Capella in the South China Sea. Photo: Marinetraffic/Manuel Hernandez

Regarding Malaysia’s July 29, 2020 note verbale to the CLCS, the expert said it is a follow-up to its original partial submission to the CLCS and a Chinese counter-submission, both issued on December 12, 2019.

In December 2019, Malaysia made a submission for an extended continental shelf in the northern part of the South China Sea. This claim was “without prejudice to the question of delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts…” In other words, Malaysia left the door open to negotiations with its Southeast Asian neighbors in cases where their claims to an extended continental shelf overlapped.

Malaysia’s claim for an extended continental shelf was based on the 2016 Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the case the Philippines versus China. The Tribunal found that China’s claim to “historic rights” had been superseded by the UNCLOS and that China’s nine-dash line has no basis in international law.

China filed a counter-protest to Malaysia December 2019 note verbale. According to the CLCS Rules of Procedure, Annex 5(a), “In cases where a land or maritime dispute exists, the Commission shall not consider and qualify a submission made by any of the States concerned in the dispute…”

The professor noted “The purpose of Malaysia’s most recent note verbale was to forestall the CLCS from invoking Annex 5(a) and declining to hear Malaysia’s case.” Malaysia’s argued that “China’s claims to the maritime features in the South China Sea has no basis under international law.”

Campaign of “lawfare” waging on

Prof. Thayer has specified the response of related parties and show how the chorus against China’s South China Sea claims means.

He said a general proposition in international law is that international courts and arbitral tribunals will look at state practice following a ruling by an arbitral tribunal to decide on disputes brought before them. The decision by President Duterte of the Philippines to set aside the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal Award and the silence by claimant states undermined international law and left the door open for China to argue its case on the basis of “historic rights”.

“ Malaysia ’s December 2019 submission to the CLCS broke this legal logjam because it was the first of several submissions by other countries rejecting the legal basis of China’s claims,” the professor said, noting that “it also set in motion a legal tit for tat as China responded to each and every submission.”

Philippines ruled favor of in 2016 in Scarborough Shoal in lawsuit with China. Photo: Rappler

The Philippines was the first country to follow Malaysia’s lead. It submitted two notes verbales on March 6, 2020. The first submission supported the 2016 Award of the Arbitral Tribunal and argued that “China’s positions are inconsistent with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea…” The second submission by the Philippines dealt with an overlap of continental shelves with Malaysia.

Vietnam submitted three notes verbales. The first note verbale (March 30, 2020) asserted that China’s claims “seriously violate Vietnam’s sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the East Sea (international known as the South China Sea). Vietnam argued that China’s claims in the East Sea exceeded “the limits provided in UNCLOS, including claiming historic rights; these claims are without lawful effect.”

Vietnam’s second notes verbale, dated April 10, 2020, was in response to Malaysia and raised matters relating to the delimitation of continental shelves. Once again Vietnam affirmed it claims to sovereignty and sovereign rights over the Paracel and Spratly islands. Vietnam repeated its claims to sovereignty and sovereign rights over the Paracel and Spratly islands in its third note verbale, also dated April 10, 2020, in response to the Philippines.

Indonesian President Joko Widodo at Selat Lampa Port, Natuna Islands, Indonesia on Jan 8, 2020. Photo: AP

Indonesia was the fourth country to file a note verbale with the CLCS on May 26, 2020. Indonesia made three assertions: (1) it was not a party to territorial disputes in the South China Sea, (2) Indonesia’s maritime entitlements were confirmed by the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal Award, and (3) China’s “Nine-Dash line, implying historic rights, claim clearly lacks international legal basis and is tantamount to upset UNCLOS 1982.”

The American aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan on exercises in the South China Sea. Photo: EPA

The United States was the fifth country to submit a note verbale to the CLCS on June 1, 2020. The US reiterated its previous objections to China’s maritime claims and endorsed the Arbitral Tribunal’s dismissal of China’s claims to “historic rights” as incompatible with UNCLOS. The US further objected to China’s grouping widely dispersed features as a unit in order to claim that the waters enclosed by straight baselines were internal and that the unit could claim maritime entitlements.

The crew of the Royal Australian Navy Anzac class frigate HMAS Perth. Photo: Australian Defense Force

Australia was the sixth country to submit a note verbale to the CLCS. Australia provided the most detailed rejection of China’s claims. For example, Australia rejected any Chinese “maritime claims that do not adhere to its [UNCLOS] rules on baselines, maritime zones and classification of features. Australia also rejected to “China’s claims to ‘historic rights’ or ‘maritime rights and interests’ as established in the ‘long course of historical practice’ in the South China Sea.”

Like the United States, Australia declared it was illegal to draw “straight baselines connecting the outermost points of maritime features or ‘island groups’ in the South China Sea…,” claim internal waters inside these straight baselines, or claim maritime zones from submerged features.

Australia was the first country to mention the Paracel Islands. Australia stated it did not accept China’s argument that its sovereignty claims were “widely accepted by the international community” and cited protests by the Philippines and Vietnam to document its objections. Australia also expressed its strong concern over China’s claims to have “continuously and effectively” exercised sovereignty over low-tide elevations.

Finally, Australia disputed China’s claim that it was not bound by the Arbitral Tribunal Award.

The Hanoitimes – The Vietnam expert said other ASEAN members can look to Vietnam’s experience in containing the novel coronavirus.

Vietnam has widely been praised for its success in fighting Covid-19 and the results have contributed to its position as ASEAN Chair, according to Emeritus Professor Carl Thayer of the University of New South Wales, Canberra.

Emeritus professor Carl Thayer, the University of New South Wales, Canberra (UNSW Canberra). Photo: RFA

“Vietnam’s success in containing Covid-19 enhances the credibility of Vietnam’s leadership role as ASEAN Chair in the regional fight against the coronavirus,” the professor said in a recent Thayer Consultancy Background Brief.

“Other ASEAN members that are struggling against the coronavirus can look to Vietnam’s experience as they work together to devise a regional response. Vietnam’s success in the fight against the coronavirus is also reassuring ASEAN members that Vietnam can devote the time and energy needed as ASEAN Chair to address how ASEAN members can plan their recovery,” he added.

Vietnam said that Covid-19 has proven that Vietnam’s theme of ‘Cohesive and Responsive’ is best suited to the current situation. Indeed, the country’s performance during the pandemic, including Hanoi’s response to the coronavirus outbreaks has made the way it leads the region’s efforts.

According to the professor, the outbreak of Covid-19 was unexpected and it upended ASEAN’s advance planning to deal with a range of issues, such as community building. Under Vietnam’s leadership, videoconferencing was introduced to bring ASEAN leaders together to agree on common policies.

“For example, under Vietnam’s chairmanship, a videoconference of ASEAN health ministers was held in April. Vietnam was also quick to organize a videoconference of the ASEAN Plus Three – China, Japan and South Korea to obtain external assistance to fight the coronavirus,” Mr. Thayer said.

Vietnam’s Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc at a regional meeting on Covid-19. Photo: Reuters

Vietnam postponed the 36th Annual Summit and convened a Special ASEAN Summit on the Coronavirus Disease by videoconference. This was an important initial step in securing consensus on the way forward by setting up a Covid-19 Fund to purchase and share medical supplies and support.

At the 36th ASEAN Summit, leaders emphasized the importance of undertaking responsive and timely measures to address the impact of the pandemic on vulnerable sectors, including women, children, youth, the elderly, and persons with disabilities.

Infections and deaths by Covid-19 in ASEAN member states as of June 30. Source: Johns Hopkins University. Chart: Linh Pham

The bloc agreed to intensify efforts in safeguarding public goods such as health, education, and human security; create systemic changes to policy frameworks, as necessary, to reduce inequality and provide equitable access to opportunities for all, especially vulnerable and marginalized groups, including children, women, people with disabilities, elderly people and migrant workers, in accordance with domestic laws and international obligations, stated in the ASEAN Leaders’ Vision Statement.

Enhance regional platforms to promote equitable opportunities, participation and effective engagement of women, children, youth, the elderly/older persons, persons with disabilities, people living in remote and border areas, and vulnerable groups in the development and implementation of ASEAN policies and programs, read the statement.

Covid-19 has swept all ASEAN member states with Indonesia confirmed the highest number of infections, 55,092 and 2,805 deaths, followed by Singapore with 43,661 and 26 deaths, the Philippines with 36,438 and 1,255.

Meanwhile, Vietnam has confirmed 355 cases and zero deaths. As of June 30, the country has passed 75 days without local transmission.

The Hanoitimes – The late senator made tireless efforts to advocate the reconciliation of the former foes to help result in fruitful relationship like today.

Senator John McCain remains one of the major symbols in the normalization of relations between the US and Vietnam over the past two decades, said Prof. Carl Thayer, one of the leading Vietnam experts.

Sen. John McCain meets Mai Van On, who saved him in the Vietnam War, in Hanoi in 1996. Photo: AP

The Vietnam War veteran showed no rancour against his captors or the Vietnamese government while advocating reconciliation, Emeritus Professor Carl Thayer at the University of New South Wales, Canberra, said on the occasion of the second anniversary of the death of Senator John McCain and the 25th anniversary of the US-Vietnam relations.

According to Prof. Thayer, the late senator made significant contributions to the bilateral relations for three major reasons.

First, he was a prisoner of war from 1967 to 1973, yet he showed no antagonism towards his captors or the Vietnamese government.

Second, once he was elected to the US Congress, first as a Representative and then as a Senator for the Republican Party, he worked in a bipartisan fashion with representatives of the Democratic Party, such as Senator John Kerry. It is notable that when President Bill Clinton announced the normalization of relations with Vietnam in July 1995, Senator John McCain stood by his side.

Third, he regularly visited Vietnam on numerous occasions and became prominent as an advocate of reconciliation. Senator McCain was able to share his experiences with the American people as well as the establishment.

President Bill Clinton and Sen. John McCain at the moment announcing the normalization of the two countries in 1995. Photo: AFP

Prof. Thayer went on to say that two main factors motivating John McCain in building the relations between the two countries include his humanity and patriotism.

John McCain spent long years as a prisoner of war that gave him time for introspection. Like other American veterans – John Kerry, Chuck Hagel and Pete Peterson – he came to the view that Vietnam was a place not a war. He empathized with the Vietnamese people as well as American veterans and advocated reconciliation.

Meanwhile, he felt that the US as a great power should put the Vietnam War behind itself, and as a matter of national interest assist Vietnam to develop and make a contribution to stability and development in Southeast Asia, especially after Vietnam became a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It was in America’s national interest to see ASEAN succeed.

Notably, efforts made by John McCain and John Kerry during this process has helped change the way Americans thought about Vietnam and the Vietnam War, Prof. Thayer emphasized.

He explained that the US was bitterly divided during the Vietnam War. After the war ended, US-Vietnam relations were held hostage by a powerful lobby group that demanded Vietnam provide a full accounting for American Prisoners of War (POWs) and Missing in Action (MIAs).

Sen. John Kerry, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, and Sen. John McCain during a hearing of the committee on Capitol Hill in Washington, on June 24, 1992. Photo: John Duricka/AP file

Senators John McCain and John Kerry both had credibility as Vietnam War veterans and were able to turn American policy into a positive direction moving from post-war reconciliation to cooperation.

Senator McCain, a Republican, was able to lend his prestige and support to Democratic Presidents, Bill Clinton and Barrack Obama. For example, the senator spoke on the floor of the Senate in favour of the Bilateral Trade Agreement between the US and Vietnam, Prof. Thayer noted.

Mark Green, executive director of the McCain Institute for International Leadership, said John McCain’s legacy is respecting human dignity, forging against long odds a better future for former adversaries, overcoming old enmities and discredited policies, having the character to move past the debilitating wounds of war.

“McCain’s leadership was visionary but clear-eyed, steadfast, and based upon a conception of a future that would benefit both peoples, rather than a plan to settle old grievances. He and like-minded advocates in the U.S. and Vietnam started a new chapter in the history of relations between our two countries that would encourage subsequent generations to rewrite the book on our relations — from their hopeful, if wary, beginnings to a growing partnership,” he added.

Vietnamese and foreign people place flowers to pay respect to John McCain at a sculpture near Truc Bach lake in Hanoi depicting the capture the then-US Navy pilot McCain whose fighter jet was shot down in 1967. Photo: Dan Tri

Ha Kim Ngoc, ambassador of Vietnam to the US, in February 2020 chose Arizona as the first destination to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the normalization. He said the choice is for the late senator as Arizona is the place where John McCain spent most of lifetime and political career.

Pham Quang Vinh, who was ambassador of Vietnam to the US in 2014-2018, said John McCain paid significant attention to building the next generation of parliamentarians following his and his contemporaries’ efforts in relations with Vietnam.

Former Ambassador of the US to Vietnam Ted Osius said McCain tried to offer opportunities to enhance the bilateral relations to young senators like Cory Gardner, Sheldon Whitehouse, Jack Reed, Joni Ernst, and Dan Sullivan.

Thanks to efforts of Americans like late Senator McCain, the US-Vietnam relationship has become a symbol of how two former adversaries can mend ties and move toward prosperity together.

In terms of economics, two-way trade between the US and Vietnam grew from US$1.5 billion in 2001 to over US$77.6 billion in 2019.

The Hanoitimes – The third-largest Chinese state oil firm is said on the forefront of China’s sovereignty combat against the other countries.

Famous international experts have the same idea that China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) has played a direct role in asserting China’s claims in the South China Sea (called East Sea by Vietnam).

China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), the third-largest Chinese state oil firm

The comments were made after the US early this month added China’s third-largest national oil company CNOOC to a blacklist of alleged Chinese military companies that have supported Beijing’s expanding assertion in the resource-rich sea.

CNOOC’s involvement in the South China Sea is seen as an extension of China’s influence in the 3.5 million-square-kilometer waterway, VOA cited Alexander Vuving, professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii.

“CNOOC is not just a company, but it’s also on the forefront of China’s sovereignty struggles, sovereignty combat, against the other countries,” Vuving said.

CNOOC is the first oil and gas company on the US black list that already has 35 Chinese companies from aerospace, chemical, construction, energy technology, and telecommunications sectors.

The listing will not take effect until it is published in the Federal Register.

Alexander Vuving, professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii (left), Carl Thayer, Emeritus Professor at the University of New South Wales, Canberra

According to famous expert on Southeast Asia studies – Emeritus Professor Carl Thayer at the University of New South Wales, CNOOC is said to have played a direct role in asserting China’s claims in the South China Sea, most prominently by operating the Hai Yang Shi You 981 movable oil rig that kickstarted a standoff between Vietnam and China in 2014.

Blacklisting CNOOC is the most recent action the US has taken to level the playing field between American companies who are compliant with US rules and Chinese companies who flout the rules in accessing the American market, Prof. Thayer said.

The blacklist aims to limit the ability of Chinese companies with military connections operating in the US from gaining access to emerging dual use (civilianmilitary) technologies.

The blacklisting aims to prohibit American investors from buying securities in blacklisted companies from November 2021.

Prof. Thayer said the blacklisting of CNOOC will have little impact on its offshore oil operations, including the South China Sea as very few US investors have purchased CNOOC securities.

Vuving said he thinks the US sanctions could hurt CNOOC mainly “in terms of prestige.”

That opinion is shared by Mark Valencia, of China’s National Institute for South China Sea Studies. He wrote in a recent Asia Times commentary the U.S. sanctions could reduce CNOOC’s stock value and “severely damage the company’s reputation.”